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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the labour market using a matching model. In our labour market, there
are two types of workers: primary workers; and secondary workers. Primary workers are those
workers who, when in employment, are fully productive and, when in unemployment, have a
maximum search intensity. Secondary workers, on the other hand, may  be less  than fully
productive when employed. In addition, they may  have a  lower search intensity than primary
workers when unemployed. A primary worker becomes a secondary worker by first spending a
length of time in unemployment. Thus the event of an unemployed primary worker becoming a
secondary worker is duration dependent. An unemployed secondary worker can become a primary
worker by either first being employed as a secondary worker or by taking a place on a labour
market programme. However, in this model we allow for the possibility that taking a job or a place
on a labour market programme may not guarantee that the worker will become a primary worker.
In this paper, labour market programmes are directed at secondary workers in unemployment. The
general result of this modus operandi is ambiguous. The proportion of primary workers, the
proportion of secondary workers, and the rate of total unemployment can all  either increase,
decrease, or remain unchanged, when labour market programmes are used more intensively. The
same is true of total production in the economy.
1 Introduction
                                               
* Useful comments from Geezer Butler, Bertil Holmlund and Arthur van Soest are acknowledged.2
Until recently, many observers hailed Sweden’s ability to maintain low levels of unemployment as
an outstanding success. This was especially pertinent in light of the ravaging unemployment which
Great  Britain and much of Europe was experiencing. Often, this success was attributed to
Sweden’s extensive use of active labour market policies. Miller (1991) states that “whilst most
OECD countries spend only a fraction of 1% of GNP on active labour market policies, Sweden
spends between two and three percent”. Many observers, seeing Sweden’s prevalent use of active
labour market policies together with its low rate of unemployment, viewed the former as a cause
of the latter. There appears, however, to be rather little empirical evidence to support such an
opinion. Indeed, in the last few  years, Sweden has  itself experienced unemployment rates of
mainstream European magnitude, despite the continued usage of active labour market policies. For
example, in 1988 the unemployment rate was 1.6% whilst the percentage of the labour force in
labour market programmes was 1.3%. Yet in 1993, unemployment had reached a post-war high of
8.2% whilst the percentage of the labour force on labour market programmes had reached around
4%. Thus it is clear to see that there has been no let up in Sweden’s usage of labour market
programmes.
A notable feature of unemployment is the  dispersion of its durations. As Layard,  Nickell &
Jackman  (1991) point out, “between 1979 and 1986, the proportion of unemployed who had been
out of work for over a year rose from around twenty to around forty percent in Britain”. Thus we
can see quite clearly that one problem associated with unemployment is not merely its level but
also its duration. Furthermore, the widely varying duration rates of unemployment often have little
to do with the initial characteristics of the unemployed individual. Jackman & Layard (1991), for
example, find little evidence of the existence of heterogeneity as a causal factor of  unemployment
duration.  They further find strong evidence for the dependency of the  rate of  exit from
unemployment on the length of duration of unemployment: “The proportion of unemployed people
who leave unemployment within a given time period is much lower for those who have been
unemployed for longer durations. For example, in Britain in early 1984 the proportion was four
percent per quarter for men who had been unemployed for over four years, compared with forty
percent for men unemployed under three months”. Thus any matching model of the labour market3
will be more realistic if it encompasses some form of distinction between the rates of exit into
employment from long- and short-term unemployment.
Whilst there is evidence of differing exit rates from unemployment depending on duration, there is
also a possibility that longer unemployment durations result in a loss of human capital for the
worker. Just as the acquisition of skills, i.e. the formation of human capital, is a positive process,
so is the depletion of skills a negative process. When a worker is unemployed, especially for long
durations, skills become rusty and the worker’s productive potential declines. Layard, Nickell, &
Jackman, Jackman & Layard, and Pissarides (1992) all point to this possibility. If this is the case
then it will certainly be worthwhile to incorporate the possibility of skill loss resulting from
unemployment duration in our model.
With regard to reduced search intensity as a result of unemployment duration, there are two strong
reasons as to why this may occur. Firstly, a worker may become discouraged from searching for
work due to the lack of success to date. Having searched for work but had no success in obtaining
any, the worker may begin to feel that search is simply not worth the effort. They therefore curtail
the amount of effort they expend on search. Secondly, search intensity may be reduced due to the
fact that search costs money and those who have been out of employment for a given length of
time may be unable to afford the level of search which they would wish to choose if unconstrained
by their budget.
The OECD Employment Outlook (1995) points to much evidence on workers reducing their
search intensity significantly with unemployment duration, though still remaining within the labour
force with a limited search intensity. This is evidenced in a multitude of countries. Layard, Nickell,
& Jackman looking at evidence for Great Britain, find that there is some evidence of a decline in
the amount of time spent in search as a result of duration of unemployment. They find further that
the amount of money an unemployed worker spends on search activity declines heavily with
duration of unemployment. This can be seen in the following table:
Table 1
British Male Long-Spell Unemployed Workers, 1978/79.4
Hours of search per week 6 weeks duration 12 months duration
Up to 5 hours per week 54 64
6-9 hours per week 16 17






6 weeks duration 12 months duration
Nothing 26 42
Under £1 35 34
£1 - £3 26 18
£3 or more 13 6
100 100
Source: Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Page 236. These figures, which are percentages, refer to long-
spell unemployed workers. By this, they mean those workers who remained out of work after one year’s
unemployment. These workers were surveyed after 6 weeks of unemployment, and  later  after one year of
unemployment.
Thus we see that there are strong reasons as to why workers may wish to reduce their level of
search intensity as the period of time they spend as unemployed increases. Furthermore, we see
that there does exist empirical evidence of reduced search intensity as a result of duration of
unemployment. We feel, therefore, that to incorporate this possibility into our model adds
significantly to our analysis.
Pissarides  (1992) looks at skill loss within an overlapping generations framework. In an
environment where firms are unable to discriminate ex ante between workers of different skill
levels, he finds that a one-period negative shock to employment can persist for a long time after
the duration of the shock and the maximum duration of unemployment. The negative shock leads
to a fall in hiring which in turn leads to an increase in the  duration of  unemployment. This
increased duration leads to a loss of skill meaning that workers become less attractive to firms. As
a result, fewer jobs come onto the market next period. Thus the unemployment duration of the
new cohort of unemployed is also above the trend value, even if all of the unemployed from the
last period have exited from unemployment.
Another attempt at explaining the persistence result of a negative shock to employment is that of
Diego (1994). Diego again uses an overlapping generations framework with a matching structure5
to analyse the persistence of a shock. He finds that a fall in skill resulting from unemployment
leads to the persistence of transitory shocks. This is despite the fact that firms are able ex ante to
discriminate between different types of workers, unlike in the Pissarides paper. What drives the
persistence result here, is a certain degree of complementarity in production between workers with
different skill levels.
Whilst there is an abundance of literature on the usage of labour market policies, little is really
mentioned as to how these labour market policies are actually carried out. In this paper, we look at
a matching model where there is a single labour market but two types of workers: primary
workers; and secondary workers. Primary workers exhibit maximum productivity and maximum
search intensity. Secondary workers, on the other hand, exhibit either lower productivity, in
relation to primary workers, and/or low search intensity. Primary workers move from the primary
labour force to the secondary labour force by flowing from primary unemployment to secondary
unemployment. Exit from the secondary sector to the primary sector, however, can occur through
one of two ways: Firstly, a worker can exit from a secondary job into primary unemployment; and,
secondly, a worker can  leave secondary unemployment to gain a place on a  labour market
programme and from there exit into primary unemployment. The  very fact  that a worker has
recently held a job or been on a labour market programme can rehabilitate them into the primary
labour force. Indeed, the usage of labour market programmes in this model is limited to attempting
to rehabilitate unemployed workers back into the primary labour force. This modus operandi is
strongly motivated by such comments as that made by Jackman & Layard that “... if long-term
unemployment can destroy human capital, it is more likely that work experience can rebuild it”.
It is important to note, however, that just because a secondary worker has taken a job or been on a
labour market programme, this does not necessarily transform them into a primary worker. Thus
in this paper, we allow for the possibility that a worker who has taken a secondary job or a place
on a labour market programme may exit back into secondary unemployment rather than primary
unemployment. How we model this will be seen later in this paper, but essentially the worker
taking a secondary job or a place on a labour market programme can see it as a lottery. Whether
the worker exits into the primary labour force or the secondary labour force is a matter of chance.6
Three characteristics of this study distinguish it from other matching-model analyses. Firstly, it
allows for the possibility of skill loss, as a result of unemployment duration. Thus the longer a
worker  stays in unemployment, the  more  likely is that worker to become less-than-fully
productive. Secondly, it provides for the possibility that workers may become less likely to obtain
a job, as a result of length of time in unemployment. This may be the result of the following: (a)
Firms may prefer to search for primary workers in the labour market; and (b) secondary workers
may search less intensively for a job than primary workers, due to being discouraged from their
lack of success to date. Allowing for a lower possibility of a match occurring between a firm and
an unemployed worker due to duration of unemployment has, however, also been analysed in a
matching framework in Miller (1995b).
The final difference, that the participation on a labour market programme or the acceptance of a
regular job may not transform a secondary worker into a primary worker, is a unique idea within
the matching-model framework. It allows for the possibility that labour market programmes may
not be designed correctly and that they may merely be a stop-gap between spells of secondary
unemployment. Thus the idea that participation on a labour market programme will necessarily
transform a worker from a secondary worker to a primary worker is relaxed in this paper.
Similarly, the  idea that the acceptance of a regular job by a secondary worker will transform that
worker into a primary worker is also relaxed. The addition of these possibilities to the model make
it a far more general model with which to analyse the labour market than otherwise.
In this paper, we undertake some simulations to see  how the targeting of labour market
programmes at those in secondary unemployment affects the labour market. From our simulations,
we find that anything can happen. The proportion of the labour force who are primary workers
and the proportion of the labour force who are secondary workers, can either increase, decrease,
or remain unchanged This result, however, depends on how well labour market programmes
transform secondary into primary workers in comparison with secondary employment. The effect
on the total unemployment rate is ambiguous.7
This paper takes the following format: In the next section, we make our model explicit, setting out
the framework and assumptions from which our results are derived. In Section 3, we briefly
review the comparative statics of the model. In Section 4, we undertake some simulations to gain
an idea of the likely outcomes of using labour market programmes. In Section 4.1, we look at an
example of a labour market where there is no skill loss, but search intensity is lower amongst
secondary workers. In this example, secondary workers have a fifty percent chance of exiting into
the primary labour force from either a regular job or a labour market programme. In Section 4.2,
we analyse a labour market where both skill loss and lower search intensity are exhibited by
secondary workers. If a secondary worker takes a regular job, they are guaranteed to exit from
that job  into the primary labour force. However, if they take a place on a labour market
programme, then they only have a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force.
In Section 4.3, workers in the secondary labour force again exhibit lower productivity and lower
search intensity; though this time, if they take a place on a labour market programme they are
guaranteed to exit into the primary labour force, whilst if they take a regular job, they only have a
fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force. Section 4.4 shows a labour market
similar to that analysed in Section 4.3 except that skill loss is even more pronounced. In our final
simulation, in Section 4.5, we see an example of a labour market where skill loss is present though
not any reduction in search intensity. In this example, a secondary worker who takes a regular job
is guaranteed to exit into the primary labour force. A secondary worker who takes a place on a
labour market programme, however, has only a ten percent chance of exiting into the primary
labour force.
For all the simulations which we undertake, we start each analysis from a situation where there are
no labour market programmes and proceed by increasing the flow out of secondary unemployment
into programmes. By starting with a base run where labour market programmes are absent we are
able to compare different intensities of the usage of such programmes with a situation where they
are absent. Section 5 summarises the results from the preceding analysis and attempts to draw a
conclusion.8
2 The Model
The model which we consider in this paper is a matching model of the labour market where the
matching of workers to jobs is both costly and time-consuming. Thus, in equilibrium, there is
unemployment because a well-defined labour market does not exist. Firms do not immediately
meet workers. Workers are matched to jobs by an aggregate matching function  () Hh S V º ,,
where S is the number of searchers and V is the number of vacancies. H is characterised by
constant returns to scale technology and is increasing in both its arguments. Thus, should there be
more searchers in the labour market, then there will be more matches taking place, firms finding it
easier to find workers. Similarly, more vacancies will make it easier for a worker to find a vacancy
and fill it. The number of searchers is equal to the number of primary workers in unemployment
plus some proportion of the number of secondary workers in unemployment. Thus we have the
identity SU c U º+ 12 , where U1 and U2 denote the number of primary and secondary workers in
unemployment respectively and 0 1 <£ c  The motivation for allowing secondary unemployment to
be weighted by c1 which is able to take a value below unity, lies in the possibility that those in
secondary unemployment do not search as intensively as those in primary unemployment.
In the economy which we analyse, the total labour force (L) is fixed. Thus we do not allow for
flows into or out of the labour force. In this paper, we denote the rates of primary and secondary
unemployment as uU L 11 º  and uU L 22 º  respectively. (The convention hereafter will be that
all lower-case letters refer to the respective rates of the stocks concerned. Thus ee r 12 , , and   refer
to the rate of employment of primary workers, the rate of employment of secondary workers, and
the proportion of the labour force on labour market programmes, respectively.) The vacancy rate
is denoted by vV L º . We let qºVS  represent labour market tightness. An increase in q
implies an increase in labour market tightness, and vice-versa. We further let qH V º  represent
the rate at which vacant jobs are filled. Due to the constant returns to scale assumption we have
                                               
1 We assume that c ¹ 0, since equality implies that labour market programmes must always be in use. This would
clearly be unreasonable, and would prevent us from analysing the difference between situations with and without
labour market programmes.9
() () () qh S Vh qq ºº ,, 1 1 1 , where  () ¢< q q0. The flow of new hires into jobs is given as HS ºa ,
where  () ()() aq q ºº HV VS q . The function  () aq is increasing in its argument.
Since  () HS U c U ºº + aa 12 , it is clear that HV U V c U V º+ aa 12 . The first term, aUV 1 ,
is in fact the rate at which a vacant job is filled by a primary worker whilst the second term,
acU V 2 , is the rate at which a vacant job is filled by a secondary worker. Denoting the rates at
which vacant jobs become filled by primary and secondary workers as q1 and q2, respectively,
allows us to write the following identity: qq q º+ 12 . Furthermore, we can view both q1 and q2 as
some portion of q. By setting qH V 1 ºy  and  () qH V 2 1 º- y , we arrive at the following
identities:



























We assume that regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process. The arrival rate for a
worker in U1 is a, whilst the arrival rate for a worker in U2 is ca. Thus if c <1, then the arrival
rate of job offers to an unemployed secondary worker is lower than that of an unemployed primary
worker. In our model, places on labour market programmes are only available to secondary
workers in unemployment. Offers for placements on labour market programmes arrive according
to a Poisson process with parameter g . Notice that in this model there is no on-the-job search.
f s   and   are the exogenously given rates at which regular jobs held by primary and secondary
workers break up, respectively. Placements on labour market programmes break up at a rate p
which is government-determined. Since we consider labour market programmes to be temporary
in this paper, we assume both that pf ps >>   and that  , i.e. that placements on labour market
programmes break up at a faster rate than either of the regular employment categories. We assume
that  p  is also bounded from above since labour market programmes are used to rehabilitate
secondary workers back into the primary labour force. If the length of time spent on a labour
market programme were too short, then the possibility that a labour market programme would to
transform a secondary worker into a primary workers would be zero.10
A worker will find themself in one of five possible labour force states: primary employment (E1);
secondary employment (E2); primary unemployment; secondary unemployment; and on labour
market programmes (R). A diagrammatic representation of our model is given in Figure 1, below.
The boxes E1, E2, U1, U 2, and R, refer to the stocks of primary employment, secondary
employment, primary unemployment, secondary unemployment, and those on labour market
programmes, respectively. The arrows represent the flows between the stocks. As can be seen,
there is only one route of exit from the primary labour force to the secondary labour force: that of
flowing from primary unemployment into secondary unemployment. However, there are two ways
of leaving the secondary labour force to enter the primary labour force. The worker can either exit
from secondary employment; or they can gain a place on a labour market programme and from
there enter the primary labour force. Either way, the act of gaining either a secondary job or a
placement on a labour market programme has the possibility of rehabilitating the worker into the
primary labour force. Though this is not guaranteed.
Figure 1.
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For a steady-state equilibrium, we require that the flows into a stock equal the flows out of the
said stock. Thus we have the following equations:11
[1] fa eu 11 =
[2] () al f m s h p += + + ue e r 11 2
[3] sa ec u 22 =
[4] () ( ) ( ) cu e u r ag m s l p h += - + + - 22 1 11
[5] pg ru = 2
(We also have the identity 1 1212 º++++ eeuur .)
The above equations determine the various proportions of the stocks, given q. (Note that we have
() aa q = .) To obtain the value of q, we must look at how wages and vacancies are determined.
Essentially there are two sides to the wage bargain: the firm’s side; and the worker’s. Firstly, we
shall look at the firm’s side.
All firms are small. Each firm has only one job which is either occupied or vacant. All vacancies
are the same. They can be filled by either a primary worker or a secondary worker. In this model,
firms  are  able to distinguish between primary and secondary workers. There is complete
information in this model. Furthermore, there is no complementarity in production between
primary and secondary workers. Thus, if we crowd out secondary employment, for example, this
will not affect the productivity of those in primary employment.
A job filled by a primary worker has an expected present value to the firm of Jo1, whilst a job
filled by a secondary worker has an expected present value to the firm of Jo2. A vacant job yields
an expected present value to the firm of Jv. Letting d represent the discount rate, y the constant
marginal product of a primary worker, a a multiplicative term between zero and one to represent
the possibility of lower productivity of a secondary worker due to their susceptibility to skill loss,
and k the cost of maintaining a vacancy, then Jo1, Jo2, and Jv satisfy the following equations:
[6] () df Jy w J J ov o 11 1 =- + -
[7] () ds Ja y w J J ov o 22 2 =-+ -
[8] ()() ()() d J k qJJqJJ vo v o v =- + × - + × - 11 2212
(w1 and w2 refer to the wages of primary and secondary workers, respectively.)
As can be seen, a vacancy involves a cost per period of k and is turned into an occupied job either
at the rate  () q1 ×  for a primary worker or  () q2 ×  for a secondary worker. Vacancies are kept open
for as long as they yield a positive profit. Due to the small firm assumption, Jv = 0 in equilibrium.
The value of a job occupied by a primary worker is found from [6] to be  ( ) ( ) J y w o1 1 = - + d f ,
and the value of a job occupied by a secondary worker is found from [7]  to be
() () Ja y w o 22 =- + ds . Substituting JJ oo 12  and   into [8] yields the  zero-profit condition for
firms:
[9] () () ( ) () () ( ) () () df ds ds df + + =×- ++× - + kq y w q a yw 11 2 2
But why would a firm ever fill a vacancy with a secondary worker when there are primary workers
in the labour market looking for employment? Quite simply, the reason for filling a job with a
secondary worker is that the other option open to the firm is to wait for a primary worker to come
along and fill the vacancy. The choice is not between filling the position with a secondary worker
and filling the  position with a  primary worker, but rather between filling the vacancy with a
secondary worker or leaving the vacancy unfilled. Thus the firm chooses to employ secondary
workers.
Having discussed the firm’s side of the wage bargain, we shall now discuss the worker’s side of
the story before making the bargaining scheme explicit. Since there are five possible labour-market
states for a worker to find themself in, there are five possible value functions. We let
LLLL L eeuu r 1212 ,  ,  ,  , and   represent the expected discounted lifetime income for workers in
primary employment, secondary employment, primary unemployment, secondary unemployment,
and labour market programmes, respectively. The value functions are as follows:
[10] () df LL L eu e w
11 1 1 =+ -
[11] () () dr a l LL L L L ue u u u w
11 1 2 1 1 =+ -+ -13
[12] () () () dm s m s LL LL L eu e u e w
21 2 2 2 21 =+ - + - -
[13] () ( ) dra g LL L L L ue u r u wc
22 2 2 2 =+ -+ -
[14] () () () drh p h p LL L L L rr u r u r w =+ -+ - -
12 1
(Where  () ( ) we we w ee º×+ × + 11 22 1 2  is the average wage.)
As can be seen, benefits to primary workers in unemployment are linked to the average wage via
the replacement ratio r1, whilst unemployment benefits to secondary workers in unemployment
and pay to those on labour market programmes are both linked to the average wage via rr 2  and  r
respectively.  All  replacement ratios lie between zero and  one. The  model exhibits incentive
compatibility in that the discounted expected lifetime income from holding a regular job is always
higher than the value of being unemployed. Since we direct labour market programmes at those
secondary workers in unemployment, we require that LL re >
2 . Notice that we do not require
that  LL ru >
1 , since labour market programmes are targeted purely at those in secondary
unemployment.
The wage of both primary and secondary workers is the result of a Nash bargain. For workers in
the primary labour force, the Nash bargain in a particular firm i solves
() () [] () [] max we u o v ii ii i wJ w J







where  L u1 is the fall-back value for primary workers should they not gain regular employment.
The outcome of this Nash bargain is the following wage equation:










where the equilibrium conditions ww
i 11 =  and Jv = 0 are imposed. For workers in the secondary
labour force, the Nash bargain solves
() () [] () [] max we u o v
ii ii i wJ w J







where L u2  is the fall-back value for secondary workers should they not gain regular employment
This Nash bargain yields the following wage equation:










where again the equilibrium conditions ww
i 22 =  and Jv = 0 are imposed. As can be seen, any
policy which reduces the discounted expected income difference L L e u j j - ,  j =12 , , will increase
wj.
The complete model consists of sixteen equations, namely the flow-equilibrium conditions [1] -
[5], the zero-profit condition [9], the value functions [10] - [14], and the two wage equations [11]
and [12]. In addition, we have  () aa q = ,  () [] () qu u c u q 11 12 =+ q , and  ( ) [ ] ( ) q cu u cu q 1 2 1 2 = + q .
These equations determine the endogenous variables: eeuu 1212 , , , ,  r,
aq , ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  eeu 121 qq u 12 2 LLLL L r ww , ,  and  12 .
3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we show the  comparative statics of the model.  Since a change in the policy
parameter g  has both a direct effect on the size of a stock and an indirect effect on a  stock
through its influence on labour-market tightness q, we show both the derivative of the stocks with
respect to g  and the derivative of the stocks with respect to labour-market tightness q. The
comparative statics of the model are as follows: ¶¶ g e 1 0
>
<; ¶¶ q e 1 0 > ; ¶¶ g e 2 0 < ; ¶¶ q e 2 0 ³
< ;
¶¶ g u 1 0
>
<; ¶¶ q u 1 0
>
<; ¶¶ g u 2 0 < ; ¶¶ q u 2 0 < ; ¶¶ g r > 0 ; ¶¶ q r < 0 .15
The derivative of the various stocks with respect to the policy parameter g , show the qualitative
relationship between the stock concerned and the policy parameter when labour-market tightness
q is held constant. Also shown is the derivative of the various stocks with respect to q, i.e., the
indirect effect. As can be seen, the direct effect of an increase in the flow into labour market
programmes is to increase e1, u1, and r, and to reduce e2 and u2. However, to gain the overall
qualitative effect of an increase in g  on a stock’s size, we must see what happens to q and how
this affects the stock. We find that we are unable to sign the relationship between gq   and  , i.e.
q g
>
< 02. Thus the proportion of each of these stocks can either increase, decrease, or remain
unchanged. To see clearly what happens when the flow out of secondary unemployment and into
labour market programmes is increased, we need to resort to some numerical simulations.
4 Some Simulations
In this section, we show examples of simulations which we have undertaken. These simulations
include skill loss and lower search intensity as well as the possibility that taking a regular job or a
place on a labour market programme may not transform the secondary worker into a primary
worker. Each simulation starts from a base run without labour market programmes. From this base
run, we increase the flow from secondary unemployment onto labour market programmes.
In our simulations, we also analyse how total production in the economy may be affected by using
labour market programmes. Using the following definition of total production
TP e y e y ry vk r º++ - 11 22
where  y1,  y2, and yr  denote the production of a worker in e1, e2, and r, respectively, we give
some idea as to how  total production changes. In the  following tables, TP 1 indicates total
production for the economy where those on labour market programmes are totally unproductive,
i.e. T P ey eay v k 11 2 =+× - . TP2, on the other hand, gives a measure for total production in the
                                               
2 This is difficult to prove analytically. However, simulations were undertaken which confirm that the sign of the
relationship is ambiguous. Details available from the author on request.16
economy where those on labour market programmes are as productive as those in secondary
employment, i.e.  () TP e y e r ay vk 21 2 =++ - .
4.1 No Skill Loss but Lower Search Intensity. 50% Chance of Exiting into the Primary
Labour Force from Secondary Employment and Labour Market Programmes.
In this section, we look at an example where there is no skill loss, i.e. a=1.0, but search intensity is
lower amongst those in secondary unemployment. In this example, we let c=0.5. A secondary
worker in either regular employment or on a labour market programme has a fifty percent chance
of exiting into the primary labour force. We start with a base run where there are no labour market
programmes, and gradually increase the flow into the  programmes.  Table 2 shows us what
happens:
Table 2
g e1 e2 u1 u2 rvqw 1 w 2 TP 1 TP2
0.0 80.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 2.07 0.259 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 81.72 7.87 6.54 3.36 0.50 1.91 0.232 99.97 100.72 99.71 100.28
0.002 82.98 6.40 6.92 2.85 0.85 1.81 0.217 99.96 101.22 99.57 100.54
0.005 85.14 4.02 7.52 1.89 1.42 1.67 0.197 99.97 102.02 99.47 101.08
0.01 86.65 2.45 7.91 1.19 1.79 1.59 0.186 99.98 102.56 99.49 101.52
0.02 87.73 1.37 8.17 0.68 2.04 1.54 0.180 99.99 102.94 99.54 101.87
0.05 88.53 0.59 8.36 0.30 2.22 1.50 0.176 100.01 103.21 99.61 102.13
0.1 88.83 0.30 8.42 0.15 2.29 1.49 0.175 100.02 103.31 99.63 102.23
0.5 89.09 0.06 8.48 0.03 2.34 1.48 0.174 100.02 103.40 99.66 102.32
We set qm = - q 04 .  and kw a = . The following parameter values pertain to this table: A=0 75051093 .;
B = 0 69785026 .3 ; r r = 06 .;   rr 12 05 == .;   y = 115; d=0 05 365 .;   f=1 2400; l=1 1080; p=1 150;

















, are all given as
indices with the value in the base run set equal to 100.00.
As can be seen, the general effect of an increase in the flow into labour market programmes in this
scenario is an increase in the primary labour force, a decrease in the secondary labour force, and a
slight reduction in total unemployment. Total production decreases if yr = 0, and increases if
                                               
3 The values of the firm- and union-power exponentials in the Nash bargain have been chosen so as to set the
unemployment and employment rates at exact values in the base runs. This allows simpler comparisons between the
base run and the subsequent equilibrium to be made. This is true for all simulations.17
ya y r =. Whether labour market programmes are considered successful here largely depends on
whether those on labour market programmes are productive or not.
4.2  Skill Loss and  Lower Search Intensity. 100% Chance of Exiting into the  Primary
Labour Force from Secondary Employment; 50% Chance of Exiting into the Primary
Labour Force from Labour Market Programmes.
In this section, we look at an example of a labour market which exhibits both skill loss and lower
search intensity amongst those in the secondary labour force. We assume that those in secondary
employment are eighty percent as productive as those in primary employment, i.e. a=0.8, and that
those in secondary unemployment only search fifty percent as intensively as those in primary
unemployment, i.e. c=0.5. A secondary worker in regular employment has a 100% chance of
exiting into the primary labour force, whilst a secondary worker on a labour market programme
has a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force. We start with a base run where
there are no labour market programmes, and gradually increase the flow into the programmes.
Table 3 shows us what happens:
Table 3
g e1 e2 u1 u2 rvqw 1 w 2 TP 1 TP2
0.0 80.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 1.28 0.160 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 80.19 9.21 6.21 3.81 0.57 1.23 0.152 99.99 100.35 99.55 100.08
0.002 80.40 8.50 6.40 3.61 1.08 1.19 0.145 99.99 100.66 99.18 100.17
0.005 81.00 6.80 6.84 3.06 2.30 1.10 0.132 99.98 101.37 98.40 100.51
0.01 81.82 5.00 7.26 2.37 3.55 1.02 0.121 99.99 102.09 97.76 101.03
0.02 82.80 3.22 7.64 1.58 4.75 0.96 0.113 100.01 102.78 97.32 101.70
0.05 83.89 1.54 7.94 0.78 5.85 0.91 0.109 100.04 103.41 97.08 102.47
0.1 84.40 0.83 8.06 0.42 6.30 0.89 0.107 100.06 103.68 97.03 102.83
0.5 84.89 0.17 8.15 0.09 6.70 0.87 0.106 100.07 103.92 97.00 103.18
We set qm = - q 04 .  and kw a = . The following parameter values pertain to this table: A=086462813 .;
B = 0 808841 . ;  r r = 06 .;  rr 12 05 == .;  y = 115;  d=0 05 365 .;   f=1 1600;  l=1 360;  p=1 150;

















, are all given as indices with the
value in the base run set equal to 100.00.
Again, using labour market programmes leads to an increase in the primary labour force and a
decrease of the secondary labour force. Total unemployment initially increases very slightly before
declining with increased flows onto labour market programmes. As with the previous example,18
whether total production increases or decreases depends strongly on whether those on labour
market programmes are productive or not.
4.3  Skill Loss and  Lower Search Intensity. 50% Chance of Exiting  from Secondary
Employment into the Primary Labour Force; 100% Chance of Exiting from a Labour
Market Programme into the Primary Labour Force.
In this section, the productivity and search intensity of secondary workers is the same as in the
immediately preceding example. This time, however, secondary workers in regular employment
have a fifty percent chance of exiting into the primary labour force whilst those on labour market
programmes have a 100% chance of leaving the secondary labour force. Thus, here, labour market
programmes are completely successful in transforming secondary workers into primary workers.
This is in contrast to regular jobs for secondary workers, which give the worker a fifty percent
chance of exiting into the primary labour force. Table 4 gives us the results:
Table 4
g e1 e2 u1 u2 rvqw 1 w 2 TP 1 TP2
0.0 80.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 2.07 0.259 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 81.33 6.79 7.85 3.50 0.52 1.63 0.170 99.95 105.43 99.03 99.51
0.002 82.82 4.82 8.80 2.73 0.82 1.47 0.145 100.00 107.94 99.10 99.86
0.005 87.35 0.00 9.56 1.77 1.33 1.32 0.138 100.21 – 100.03 101.26
0.01 87.71 0.00 9.98 0.92 1.39 1.29 0.129 100.26 – 100.48 101.77
0.02 87.89 0.00 10.22 0.47 1.42 1.27 0.125 100.29 – 100.71 102.03
0.05 88.00 0.00 10.37 0.19 1.44 1.26 0.122 100.31 – 100.84 102.18
0.1 88.04 0.00 10.42 0.10 1.45 1.26 0.121 100.31 – 100.89 102.24
0.5 88.07 0.00 10.46 0.02 1.45 1.26 0.120 100.32 – 100.93 102.28
We set qm = - q 04 .  and kw a = . The following parameter values pertain to this table: A=0 79652669 .;
B = 0 68219587 .; r r = 06 .;   rr 12 05 == .;   y = 115; d=0 05 365 .;   f=1 2400; l=1 1080 ; p=1 150;

















, are all given as indices with the
value in the base run set equal to 100.00.
The consequence of increasing the flow into labour market programmes is to increase the
proportion of workers in the primary labour force and to decrease the proportion of workers in the
secondary labour force. Notice that when g=0005 .  and above, secondary employment is
completely  crowded out. This is due to the fact that the worker in secondary unemployment has a19
higher expected lifetime income than if they were to enter secondary employment, i.e. LL ue 22 > .
The total unemployment rate is higher for all levels of labour market programme usage.
Looking at what happens to total production, we see that for low values of g , total production is
lower than in the base run. However at values of 0.005 and above it is higher, even when those on
labour market programmes are completely unproductive. The increase of primary employment and
the reduction in vacancies is more than enough to offset the loss of production from secondary
employment.
4.4 Skill Loss and  Lower Search Intensity. 50% Chance of Exiting  from Secondary
Employment into the Primary Labour Force; 100% Chance of Exiting from a Labour
Market Programme into the Primary Labour Force.
In this section, we see a labour market similar to that analysed in Section 4.3 except that skill loss
is even more pronounced. Secondary workers are 70% as productive as their primary
counterparts, rather than 80% as in the previous example, i.e. a=0.7 here, rather than a=0.8. Table
5 on the following page shows us what happens.
Here, we see that by increasing the value of g , we increase the proportion of those in the primary
labour force whilst we decrease the proportion of those in the secondary labour force, just as in
the previous examples. Total unemployment is higher when labour market programmes are used.
Notice that secondary unemployment decreases when g  is increased to 0.001, increases when g
is increased to 0.002, but again continues to decrease when g  is increased still further. This erratic
behaviour of secondary unemployment is due to the fact that when g  is increased to 0.001, it is
still incentive compatible for the secondary worker in unemploym ent  to accept a regular job.
However, when g  is increased to 0.002 (and higher values), secondary employment is completely
crowded out since LL ue 22 > . As a result, there is a sudden halt to the flow from U 2 into E2.
Consequently secondary unemployment increases, despite the fact that there is an increased flow
out of secondary unemployment into labour market programmes. When g  is increased still20
further, secondary unemployment again continues to fall since secondary employment cannot be
crowded out any more.
Table 5
g e1 e2 u1 u2 rvqw 1 w 2 TP 1 TP2
0.0 70.00 20.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 2.07 0.259 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 72.71 14.30 8.50 3.90 0.59 1.61 0.154 99.96 104.25 98.90 99.40
0.002 83.66 0.00 10.20 4.72 1.42 1.47 0.144 100.41 – 100.13 101.34
0.005 84.89 0.00 11.41 2.11 1.58 1.40 0.122 100.55 – 101.71 103.06
0.01 85.32 0.00 11.92 1.10 1.66 1.37 0.115 100.60 – 102.26 103.67
0.02 85.53 0.00 12.21 0.57 1.70 1.35 0.111 100.63 – 102.54 103.99
0.05 85.66 0.00 12.39 0.23 1.72 1.34 0.108 100.65 – 102.71 104.18
0.1 85.71 0.00 12.45 0.12 1.73 1.34 0.107 100.66 – 102.77 104.24
0.5 85.74 0.00 12.50 0.02 1.74 1.34 0.107 100.66 – 102.81 104.29
We set qm = - q 04 .  and kw a = . The following parameter values pertain to this table: A=081075038 .;
B = 0 73560319 .; r r = 06 .;   rr 12 05 == .;   y = 115; d=0 05 365 .;   f=1 2100; l=1 1080; p=1 150;

















, are all given as
indices with the value in the base run set equal to 100.00.
Notice that both measures of total production show an initial decline before increasing. Even if
those on labour market programmes are completely unproductive, total production is higher than
in the base run since the more-productive primary employment is crowded in at the expense of the
less-productive secondary employment. Furthermore, vacancies decline meaning that less
productive potential is spent on maintaining vacancies. Thus, even though total employment is
lower when labour market programmes are in existence, the level of total production is still higher
4.5  Skill Loss but  No Reduction in Search Intensity. 100% Chance of Exiting  from
Secondary Employment into the Primary Labour Force; 10% Chance of Exiting from a
Labour Market Programme into the Primary Labour Force.
In this, our final example, there is skill loss present but no reduction in search intensity. Thus in
this example, a=0.8 and c=1.0. Those secondary workers in regular employment have a 100%
chance of exiting into the primary labour force, i.e. m=10 . , whilst those on labour market
programmes have only a 10% chance of exiting into the primary labour force, i.e. h=01 . . Table 6
shows us what happens when labour market programmes are used:21
Table 6
g e1 e2 u1 u2 rv qw 1 w 2 TP 1 TP2
0.0 80.00 10.00 6.00 4.00 0.00 1.60 0.160 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.001 79.54 9.88 6.00 3.98 0.60 1.58 0.159 100.00 100.09 99.38 99.94
0.002 79.09 9.77 6.00 3.95 1.19 1.56 0.157 100.00 100.19 98.78 99.87
0.005 77.77 9.43 6.01 3.88 2.91 1.51 0.153 99.99 100.47 96.99 99.69
0.01 75.67 8.89 6.01 3.77 5.65 1.42 0.146 99.98 100.93 94.16 99.40
0.02 71.86 7.92 6.03 3.55 10.64 1.27 0.133 99.97 101.83 89.03 98.87
0.05 63.37 5.73 6.07 2.92 21.92 0.96 0.107 99.95 104.13 77.51 97.79
0.1 56.41 3.71 6.03 2.12 31.73 0.72 0.089 99.97 106.45 67.86 97.22
0.5 50.34 0.94 5.66 0.57 42.48 0.51 0.082 100.10 109.48 58.52 97.83
We set qm = - q 04 .  and kw a = . The following parameter values pertain to this table:  A=087091801 .;
B = 0 70512695 .;  rr = 0.9 ;  rr 12 05 == .;   y = 115;  d=0 05 365 .;   f=1 1600;  l=1 180;  p=1 150;

















, are all given as
indices with the value in the base run set equal to 100.00.
Starting from an initial situation where total unemployment is 10%, we see that by increasing the
number of workers on labour market programmes, we further reduce unemployment. However,
whilst we reduce both primary and secondary unemployment, we also reduce both primary and
secondary employment. Regular employment is significantly crowded out  be  labour market
programmes. As a result of this crowding out, both measures of total production decline; TP 1
significantly.
This example shows that the usage of labour market programmes in this scenario is a failure.
Regular employment declines, as does total production. Furthermore, unlike in all of the previous
examples, the  proportion of workers in the  primary labour force declines. Thus the aim  of
transforming secondary workers into primary workers, fails.
5 Conclusion
From the preceding analysis it is painfully clear that the usage of labour market programmes in the
model which we have specified in this paper is not an unmitigated success. Five examples of22
labour markets were given in Section 4; each of these indicated varying results when labour
market programmes were directed at secondary workers in unemployment.
In four of the examples above, there was a possibility that total production in the economy could
be increased by the usage of labour market programmes. However, this increase was not
guaranteed in any of the examples. Total production tended to increase when skill loss existed
amongst secondary workers and when those on labour market programmes were as productive as
those in secondary employment. Examples 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate how whether those on labour
market programmes are as productive as those in secondary employment or totally unproductive
affects whether introducing labour market programmes has a positive or a negative effect on total
production. In example 4.5, where labour market programmes crowd out all other states in the
labour market, total production declines slightly when those on labour market programmes are as
productive as those in secondary employment, but declines drastically when those on labour
market programmes are unproductive. Thus whether total production increases or decreases when
labour market programmes are introduced often depends on whether those on labour market
programmes are productive or not.
In examples 4.3 and 4.4, we see situations when secondary employment is completely crowded
out by the usage of labour market programmes. This is due to the fact that it is more-appealing for
the secondary worker to be in unemployment rather than in employment, i.e. LL ue 22 > . Despite
this total crowding out of regular employment for secondary workers, total production increases,
even if those on labour market programmes are completely unproductive. This is due to two
things: Firstly, there is an increase in the number of workers in primary employment, where
workers are fully productive; and, secondly, there is a reduction in the number of vacancies. Since
maintaining vacancies involves using up a certain amount of the productive potential of the
economy, any reduction in the number of vacancies increases the total production of the economy.
All in all, we find that the unqualified usage of labour market programmes in the context given, is
not guaranteed to give wholly positive results. If a policy maker wishes to use labour market
programmes in the manner suggested in this paper, then they must decide whether to do so in full23
knowledge of the parameter values of the  model. Only then can the  policy maker determine
whether the effects of labour market programmes will be beneficial or otherwise.
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Differentiating [A2] with respect to g , yields the following:
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When h=0, we find that () ¶¶ g
qq u 1 0
= <. However, when h=1 and m  is low enough, we find
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Differentiating [A5] with respect to g  yields27
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Since  () ¢ > aq 0, this implies that  () () sign stock sign stock ¶¶ a ¶¶ q = . Therefore, if we can find
the differential of a labour market stock with respect to a , then we can tell from its sign whether
that stock will increase with an increase in q  or otherwise.
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